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Saturday Night Specials: A "Special" Exception in
Strict Liability Law
Every year in the United States individuals armed with Satur-
day Night Specials commit thousands of crimes.' The federal Gun
Control Act of 1968,2 aimed at eliminating the importation of these
handguns, has been ineffective. 3 Moreover, courts have ruled that
the Gun Control Act does not imply a cause of action against a Sat-
urday Night Special manufacturer when his or her product is used
in crime.4 These courts have concluded that Congress intended to
protect the public through administrative enforcement of the Gun
Control Act rather than through private suits.5 Courts have also
refused to expand existing tort law to provide Saturday Night Spe-
cial victims with an effective remedy against the manufacturer.6
A recent case may signal progress in this area. In Kelley v. R. G.
Industries, Inc.,7 the highest court of Maryland, the Court of Appeals,
ruled that strict liability could be imposed upon manufacturers of
Saturday Night Specials, and that an individual injured by such a
weapon could sue the manufacturer directly.8 The court concluded
that it was free to change the common law of torts to conform with
contemporary conditions, and that imposing strict liability on Sat-
urday Night Special manufacturers coincided with federal and state
gun control legislation. As the first decision to impose strict liabil-
ity on Saturday Night Special manufacturers under any theory,
I A "Saturday Night Special" is a small, inexpensive handgun primarily used in crime.
See United States v. Looney, 501 F.2d 1039, 1040 (4th Cir. 1974). See also Fields, Handgun
Prohibition and Social Aecessity, 23 ST. Louis U.LJ. 35 (1979) (provides a thorough discussion
of the problems caused by the ready availability of handguns in the U.S.).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1982).
3 See Kennedy, The Handgun Crime ControlAct of 1981, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 1 (1982). Sena-
tor Kennedy claims that "Saturday night specials ... are.., readily available because of a
loophole in the law that allows their lethal parts to be imported from abroad, and then
assembled and sold in this country." Id. at 7. He claims that, while federal law prohibits
the importation of Saturday Night Specials, the law does not "specifically ban the importa-
tion of gun parts, a loophole many foreign manufacturers discovered almost immediately"
after the enactment of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968. Id. at 7 n.33.
4 See Decker v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 F. Supp. 34, 36 (M.D. Ga. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 679 F.2d 212 (11 th Cir. 1982); Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Hawaii 58,
647 P.2d 713 (1982); Olson v. Ratzel, 89 Wis. 2d 227, 249-50, 278 N.W.2d 238, 248-49
(1979). See also Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common Law Ap-
proach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 777 (1983).
5 See cases cited in note 4 supra.
6 See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Burkett v. Freedom Arms,
Inc., 299 Or. 551, 704 P.2d 118 (1985). Both courts concluded that current strict liability
law did not apply to Saturday Night Special manufacturers.
7 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
8 Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
commentators have attacked Kelley as a "radical and dangerous de-
parture from fundamental principles governing ... jurisprudence
and [the] tripartite system of government."9
This note discusses and defends the Maryland court's decision
to extend strict liability to Saturday Night Special manufacturers
when their product is used in crime. Part I examines the limitations
of traditional theories of strict liability when applied to manufactur-
ers of handguns. Part II discusses Kelley and its expansion of tort
law to avoid these limitations. Part III argues that state courts have
historically enjoyed substantial law-making authority in tort law,
and that the Maryland Court of Appeals acted within its authority in
extending strict liability to Saturday Night Special manufacturers.
Part IV examines the likely impact of Kelley and concludes that the
decision creates a new, but very limited, area of strict liability that
probably will not be extended beyond its facts.
I. Traditional Theories of Strict Liability
Saturday Night Special victims' 0 and legal commentators a"
have argued that traditional strict liability theories' 2 permit courts
9 Dorr & Burch, Saturday Night Fever, THE BR IEF, Winter 1986, at 10.
10 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.,
11 See Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. KY. L. REv.
41 (1982) (arguing that the design of a handgun renders it "unreasonably dangerous");
Turley & Harrison, Strict Tort Liability of Handgun Suppliers, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 277 (1983)
("defective design" argument); Note, 4 Shot at Stricter Controls: Strict Liability for Gun Manu-
facturers, 15 PAC. L.J. 171 (1983) ("defective design" argument); Note, supra note 4 (arguing
that a Saturday Night Special is an "unreasonably dangerous product" because its design is
conducive to crime and it cannot pass the "risk/utility" test; see note 16 infra); Note, Manu-
facturers' Strict Liability for Injuries from a Well-Made Handgun, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 467
(1983) (a Saturday Night Special might not pass a "risk/utility" test).
12 "Traditional strict liability theory" refers to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 402A, 519, and 520 (1977), and its interpretation by the courts. Section 402A provides
that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Section 519 provides that:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
Section 520 provides that:
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to hold Saturday Night Special manufacturers liable for injuries re-
sulting from criminal misuse of these handguns. Under traditional
strict liability, a defendant may be held liable in two circumstances:
(1) when he or she engages in an "abnormally dangerous activity"
and injury results; i3 or (2) when he or she produces a "defective
product" that is "unreasonably dangerous," and injury results. 14
The courts currently rely on two tests to determine whether, under
the second theory, a product is unreasonably dangerous: the "con-
sumer expectation test"'15 and the "risk/utility test."' 6
Plaintiffs17 and authors' 8 contend that the manufacture of Sat-
urday Night Specials constitutes an "abnormally dangerous activ-
ity" under the Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 519 and
520.19 Courts, however, generally limit this theory of strict liability
to situations where the tortfeasor is an owner or occupier of land
and injury results from his or her use of this land. 20 Thus, a court
will hold a defendant who manufactures or stores dynamite in a
given location strictly liable for damages caused by an explosion,2 1
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors
are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977).
14 Id. § 402A.
15 The "consumer expectation" test states that a product, no matter how inherently
dangerous, cannot be defective unless it is dangerous beyond the extent contemplated by
the purchaser. See Justice Schaefer's attempt to explain this in Dunham v. Vaughan &
Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 342, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (1969) ("Although the defini-
tions of the term 'defect' in the context of products liability law use varying language, all of
them rest upon the common premise that those products are defective which are dangerous
because they fail to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of their na-
ture and intended function.").
16 Under the "risk/utility" test, a product is unreasonably dangerous if the risks of its
design outweigh the utility of the product. See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d
413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). See also Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633,
378 N.E.2d 964 (1978) (motor home exploded); Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 660
S.W.2d 404 (Mo. App. 1983) (power press caught plaintiffs hand).
17 See cases cited in notes 6 and 7 supra.
18 See note 11 supra.
19 See note 12 supra.
20 See, e.g., Note, Legal Limits of a Handgun Manufacturer's Liability for the Criminal Acts of
Third Persons, 49 Mo. L. REV. 830, 843-45 (1984); Kelley, 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147.
But see Siegler v. Kuhlman, 91 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972) (court imposed strict
liability for damages resulting from transporting gasoline in a large tank truck even though
the activity was not connected to the use of land).
21 See, e.g., Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska
1978).
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but the court will not hold the manufacturer of a steak knife used in
a stabbing liable, even though a knife is dangerous when used in
this manner.2 2 Likewise, the danger which a Saturday Night Special
poses does not render its manufacture an "abnormally dangerous
activity." Although the handgun is inherently dangerous, it is not
dangerous in connection with the use of land.
Similarly, a Saturday Night Special is not an "unreasonably
dangerous product" as contemplated by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 402A.23 Under the "consumer expectation" test, a
product is "unreasonably dangerous" only if it is dangerous be-
yond the expectation of the consumer.2 4 An unreasonably danger-
ous product is one that malfunctions, not one that operates exactly
as the consumer expects. 25 Alcohol, for example, is a dangerous
product because excess consumption intoxicates. It is not unreason-
ably dangerous, however, because the consumer expects it to intoxi-
cate.2 6 On the other hand, alcohol inadvertently mixed with poison
is unreasonably dangerous because the consumer does not expect
this mixture when he or she purchases the product.2 7 Thus, a Sat-
urday Night Special is not unreasonably dangerous simply because
it kills, since this is its expected function. Under this test, a product
that functions according to consumer expectations is not unreason-
ably dangerous even if its contemplated purpose is primarily
destructive.
Under the second test used to determine whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous, the "risk/utility" test, courts consider
whether the design of a product is so faulty that the risk of injury
from its use outweighs its utility.28 Although it has been forcefully
argued that the easy concealability of a Saturday Night Special ren-
ders it an unreasonably dangerous product under the risk/utility
test,29 courts do not apply this test unless the product actually mal-
functions3 0 Thus, an automobile manufacturer is not strictly liable
22 The comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 stress the importance of
locality in the determining whether an activity is unreasonably dangerous. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comments c, e, f, and h (1977).
23 See notes 12 and 15 supra.
24 Comment i of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) states in part:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be con-
templated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it .... [Thus g]ood whiskey is
not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and
is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous
amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
25 Id. See also note 15 supra.
26 See notes 15 and 24 supra. See also Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1912 (1984).
27 See note 24 supra.
28 See note 16 supra.
29 See note 11 supra.
30 See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
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under the risk/utility test for placing the gas tank at the rear of the
vehicle unless the vehicle actually explodes in a rear-end collision. 3'
A manufacturer of a high-lift loader without adequate safety devices
is not strictly liable under the risk/utility test unless the loader actu-
ally tips over and injures the plaintiff3 2 Similarly, a Saturday Night
Special manufacturer is not liable under the risk/utility test unless
the product malfunctions.
Thus, under traditional strict liability theories, a court cannot
hold a manufacturer of a Saturday Night Special liable when his or
her product functions in a crime exactly as the consumer contem-
plated. Courts have declined to impose liability on Saturday Night
Special manufacturers under these theories, 33 and rightly so. To
do otherwise distorts the meaning of Restatement sections 402A,
519, and 520. A court should not impose strict liability on Saturday
Night Special manufacturers if it distorts existing law to fit an inap-
propriate circumstance. The court, however, may modify the com-
mon law to compensate deserving victims. 34 The Maryland Court
of Appeals in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.3 5 adopted this approach.
II. Kelley v. R. G. Industries, Inc.
In Kelley, an armed robber shot a storeowner with a Saturday
Night Special. The victim sued Rohm Gesellschaft, the West Ger-
man manufacturer, and R.G. Industries, Inc.,36 the Miami-based
subsidiary that assembled and sold the gun to the robber. The
plaintiff sought redress under traditional strict liability theories, but
the court declined to impose liability under any of those theories.3 7
(1978); Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978); Duke v. Gulf& West-
ern Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. App. 1983). See also Note, supra note 26.
31 See Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).
32 See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978).
33 See notes 15-16, 17-20, 23-32 supra and accompanying text.
34 See Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, 187 F.2d 357, 360 (D.C.
Cir. 1950) ("[T]he very term 'common law' means a system of law not formalized by legisla-
tive action, not solidified but capable of growth and development at the hands ofjudges.").
See also UrsinJudicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229 (1981). Professor
Ursin discusses "judicial lawmaking and the common law, using tort law to illustrate gen-
eral themes." Id. at 230. He argues that state courts should adapt the common law to
"constantly changing conditions and values," and that, if anything, "the real danger is not
that judicial creativity will be excessive, but rather that the common law will not be respon-
sive enough to changing conditions and values." Id. at 231 (citing Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 363-64, 368, 373
(1965)).
35 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
36 R.G. Industries has been called "the nation's major producer of Saturday Night Spe-
cials." Id. at 159, 497 A.2d at 1161 (citing Brill, The Traffic (Legal and Illegal) In Guns,
HARPER'S, Sept. 1977, at 39).
37 304 Md. at 132-39, 497 A.2d at 1146-50. The court did not depart from traditional
interpretations of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A, 519-520 (1977). Regard-
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The court conducted an in-depth analysis of Maryland gun control
laws 38 and the federal Gun Control Act of 1968. 39 The court then
concluded that extending strict liability to Saturday Night Special
manufacturers furthered public policy in the area of gun control.40
The court did not feel constrained by common law precedents in
deciding to extend strict liability to this situation.4 1
In its analysis, the court first examined Maryland gun control
legislation. Because this legislation expressly permits citizens to
possess handguns under certain circumstances, 42 the court deter-
mined that it violates public policy to hold all handgun manufactur-
ers strictly liable for injuries resulting from legitimate uses of these
guns.43 The court pointed out, however, that Saturday Night Spe-
cials comprise a separate category of handguns which clearly are
ing § 402A, the court concluded that "[the plaintiff] confuses a product's normalfunction...
with a defect in a product's design or construction." 304 Md. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148
(emphasis in original). Regarding §§ 519-520, the court required that the "activity be ab-
normally dangerous in relation to the area where it occurs." Id. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147.
38 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 36B-36G (1982 & Supp. 1984).
39 The federal Gun Control Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1982).
40 The court stated:
[T]he policy implications of the gun control laws enacted by both the United
States Congress and the Maryland General Assembly reflect a governmental view
that there is a handgun species, i.e., the so-called Saturday Night Special, which is
considered to have little or no legitimate purpose in today's society.
304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158. The court then concluded:
For the above [and other] reasons, we conclude that it is entirely consistent with
public policy to hold the manufacturers and marketers of Saturday Night Special
handguns strictly liable to innocent persons who suffer gunshot injuries from the
criminal use of their products.
Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
41 The court stated:
The fact that a handgun manufacturer or marketer generally would not be liable
for gunshot injuries from a criminal's use of the product, under previously recog-
nized principles of strict liability, is not necessarily dispositive. This Court has
repeatedly said that "the common law is not static; its life and heart is its dyna-
mism-its ability to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for just
and fair solutions to pressing societal problems." . . . Indeed, we have not hesi-
tated to change the common law to permit new actions or remedies where we have
concluded that such course was justified.
Id. at 140, 497 A.2d at 1150-51.
42 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(c) (1982 & Supp. 1984) states in part:
Nothing... shall prevent the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by
*.. law enforcement personnel ... [nor the carrying of a handgun] ... used in
connection with a target shoot... [nor] within the confines of real estate... [nor
the carrying of a handgun] ... by any person to whom a permit [has been issued].
43 The court stated:
The express statutory provisions allowing persons to possess and carry handguns
in certain specified instances demonstrate that not all handguns or handgun usage
is inconsistent with Maryland public policy. In our view, generally to impose strict
liability upon the manufacturers or marketers of handguns for gunshot injuries
resulting from the misuse of handguns by others, would be contrary to Maryland
public policy as set forth by the Legislature.
304 Md. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1152-53.
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not sanctioned by state gun control legislation.44
The court considered it significant that Maryland law prohibits
the sale of handguns to convicted criminals,45 and that Saturday
Night Specials are mainly used by criminals. 46 The court also ob-
served that the Maryland legislature contemplated only certain uses
of handguns,47 and that Saturday Night Specials are inappropriate
for any of these uses because of their poor quality, unreliability, and
inaccuracy. 48 The court reasoned that federal law prohibiting the
importation of Saturday Night Specials provides further evidence of
their undesirability.49 The court concluded that the chief value of a
Saturday Night Special is its low price and concealability, character-
istics which encourage the very criminal activity that the legislature
sought to control.50 "[Oinly the legitimate use of handguns is con-
sistent with state policy," 5' and Saturday Night Specials serve no
legitimate purpose.
The court noted that Saturday Night Special manufacturers
know or ought to know that their product's chief use is in criminal
activity.52 In light of this foreseeability, as well as the greater
amount of fault on the part of the manufacturer as compared to the
44 See notes 45-51 infra and accompanying text.
45 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 445(d) (1982 & Supp. 1984) states:
A dealer or person may not sell or transfer a pistol or revolver to a person whom
he knows or has reasonable cause to believe has been convicted of a crime of vio-
lence ....
46 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158.
47 See note 42 supra. The court considered "legitimate" uses of handguns to include
sport, law enforcement, and self-protection. 304 Md. at 146, 497 A.2d at 1154.
48 Id. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158.
49 18 U.S.C. § 922(1) (1982). Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 925(a) (1982) allows the importa-
tion of firearms for the use of law enforcement, military, or other governmental purposes.
Based on these statutes, the court reasoned that "[t]he ban on the importation of any fire-
arm, except those used for law enforcement, military or sporting purposes, indicates Con-
gressional belief that there is a category of firearms which has little or no legitimate
purpose." 304 Md. at 150, 497 A.2d at 1156. The court concluded that this category in-
cludes Saturday Night Specials. Id. at 147, 497 A.2d at 1154.
50 Id. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158.
51 Id.
52 The court stated:
[T]he manufacturer or marketer of a Saturday Night Special knows or ought to
know that he is making or selling a product principally to be used in criminal activ-
ity. For example, a salesman for R.G. Industries, describing what he termed to be
a "special attribute" ofa Rohm handgun, was said to have told a putative handgun
marketer, " 'If your store is anywhere near a ghetto area, these ought to sell real
well. This is most assuredly a ghetto gun.'" The R.G. salesman allegedly went on
to say about another R.G. handgun, "'This sells real well, but, between you and
me, it's such a piece of crap I'd be afraid to fire the thing.'"
Id. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158 (quoting Brill, supra note 36, at 40). But see Santarelli & Calio,
Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take Products Liabilitv to the Limit, 14 ST.
MARY's L.J. 471,476 (1983) ("The allegation that gun manufacturers [know or] intend their
products to be misused as instruments of death is almost too ludicrous to require a
response.").
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innocent victim, the court concluded that it could appropriately im-
pose liability upon the manufacturer. 53 The court emphasized that
it would impose strict liability only upon those manufacturers that
produced "Saturday Night Specials," and determining whether a
handgun is a Saturday Night Special is a question of fact.54
The court did not "imply" a cause of action through federal
and state gun control laws; 55 instead, it decided that imposing strict
liability through its own initiative would coincide with these laws.
The Kelley decision sparks the familiar legal controversy on how far
a court can go before it encroaches on the legislature's authority.
Extending strict liability to Saturday Night Special manufacturers
when their product is used in criminal activity is arguably a drastic
step.5 6 But a brief examination of the history ofjudicial law-making
suggests that the step is not too drastic to take.
III. The Role of Courts in the Development of Tort Law
Under the federal system of law, a federal court functions to
interpret legislation rather than create law. 57 Only a very limited
"federal common law" exists; the legislature possesses the vast ma-
jority of law-making authority in the federal system.58
53 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
54 "[I]n a tort suit a handgun should rarely, if ever, be deemed a Saturday Night Special
as a matter of law. Instead, it is a finding to be made by the trier of facts." Id. at 157-58,
497 A.2d at 1160.
55 See Note, Implying Private Causes of Action from Federal Statutes: Amtrak and Cort Apply
The Brakes, 17 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 53, 65 (1975), in which the author explains:
There is a ... viewpoint which maintains that a court should never imply a cause of
action. This criticism of the implied remedies doctrine may be reduced to two
basic contentions: (1) the implication of a private cause of action is an invasion by
the judiciary of the legislative function; and (2) the implication of a private cause of
action often unfairly subjects the offender to a different type or level of liability
than that which the statute expressly imposes on him.
See also Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972); Note, The Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title III of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (1974); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regula-
tory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963).
56 It has been argued, however, that the doctrine of strict liability is not a drastic depar-
ture from traditional tort liability concepts. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19
Sw. L.J. 5 (1965). Dean Wade claims that "[i]n essence, strict liability.., is not different
from negligence per se. Selling a dangerously unsafe product is the equivalent of negli-
gence regardless of the defendant's conduct in letting it become unsafe." Id. at 14. Argua-
bly, it is not a drastic departure for the courts to extend strict liability from products that
are unsafe because they are defective to products that are unsafe because their very purpose
is to kill and injure. R.G. Industries is certainly aware that its guns are used in crime. See
note 52 supra.
57 Erie R.R. Co. v Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
58 Id. at 78. See also Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
The Radciff Court stated:
[T]he Court has recognized the need and authority in some limited areas to for-
mulate what has come to be known as 'federal common law'. . . . These instances
are 'few and restricted,' and fall into essentially two categories: those in which a
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In contrast, the common law tradition has granted substantial
law-making authority to state courts.59 Nowhere has this been
more visible than in the area of tort law. Virtually all of the major
tort doctrines, from negligence 60 to strict liability, 6' are court cre-
ations. In the area of strict liability, courts have steadily expanded
the law to allow more injured parties to recover. 62 "The great
judges in American history have... recogniz[ed] the duty of courts
constantly to adapt the common law [of torts] to contemporary con-
ditions and values." 63 The courts have assumed this role in the de-
velopment of tort law for at least one hundred and fifty years, with
an unfortunate abstention around the turn of the century. 64
In the mid-nineteenth century, for example, courts strongly be-
lieved that the economic growth of the nation depended on pro-
tecting industry from excessive liability. 65 Because of this, courts
imposed restrictive tort doctrines upon plaintiffs, such as contribu-
tory negligence, 66 the fellow-servant rule,67 and assumption of the
risk.68 These doctrines denied relief to many industrial accident
victims 69
After the turn of the century, industry became firmly estab-
federal rule of decision is 'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,'... and
those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive
law ....
Id. at 640 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947); Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
426 (1964)).
59 Ursin, supra note 34, at 259-63.
60 See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
61 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963). Maryland adopted strict liability in Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278
Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). See also Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317,
364 N.E.2d 267 (1977); Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110 (1975).
62 See notes 93-96 infra and accompanying text.
63 Ursin, supra note 34, at 304.
64 See Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in
Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974). Professor Nelson notes that, while
in the early nineteenth century judges decided cases on grounds of social policy, by the end
of the century "a new, formalistic style of judicial reasoning became dominant . . . [and]
judges no longer saw their task as the promotion of the goal of economic development, but
as the preservation of the logical structure of the rules and fundamental principles of the
law." Id. at 514-15. He suggests that this shift occurred because of "the cataclysmic event
of mid-nineteenth century American life-the crisis over slavery that culminated in the Civil
War." Id. at 519.
65 Id. at 520-21.
66 See Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946). See
also James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); Lowndes, Contributory Negligence,
22 GEO. LJ. 674 (1934); Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233 (1908).
67 See, e.g., Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
68 Id. at 57.
69 See generally Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 296, 94 N.E.2d 431, 448 (1911);
Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50
(1967).
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lished in this country. Legislative emphasis shifted from protecting
industry to protecting employees and their families, 70 yet the courts
failed to join the legislature by relaxing its rigid rules. 71 Commen-
tators began to challenge the courts' authority to alter the common
law as a result of the improper judicial activism of the Lochner era.72
Commentators criticized Lochner and related cases73 that the
Supreme Court decided during the early decades of this century for
usurping the power of the legislature in the most dangerous and
flagrant way: by invoking the Constitution to invalidate economic
and social legislation.74 The Supreme Court sought to impose its
own bias toward laissezfaire economics on Congress and state legis-
latures by manipulating the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 75 This was judicial activism in its worst form, because
it rendered the legislature powerless to act.76
Fear of judicial activism in constitutional law has caused com-
mentators to challenge almost any judicial innovation as "im-
proper." 77  Yet, those who would react to "Lochnerism" by
70 See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 69, at 69.
71 See note 64 supra.
72 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Supreme Court held
that a New York law prohibiting the employment of bakery employees for more than ten
hours a day or sixty hours a week was unconstitutional under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court declared that the "general right to make a contract in
relation to [a person's] business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th
Amendment." Id. at 53. Many legal scholars of the era severely criticized the Court's reli-
ance on "substantive due process." See Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21
HARV. L. REV. 495 (1908).
73 See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidated a Kansas law prohibiting
employers from requiring employees to agree to not join a labor union as a condition of
employment on due process grounds); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invali-
dated a federal law prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts on interstate railroads under the due
process clause).
74 See Warren, The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431
(1926). Professor Warren argues that because "liberty" at common law meant only free-
dom from physical restraint, it should mean no more under the due process clause. See also
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A AIodelfor a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Hand, supra note 72; Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45, 74
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
75 The due process clause reads "[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76 Ursin, supra note 34, at 267. Arguably, such improper activism continues today in
the individual rights area of constitutional law. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing that the Bill of Rights and the
fourteenth amendment create a "zone of privacy" although the right to privacy is not spe-
cifically mentioned in the Constitution).
77 See, e.g., Wilkey, Judicial Activism, Congressional Abdication, and the Need for Constitutional
Reform, 8 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 503 (1985); Berger, G. Edward IWhite's Apology forJudicial
Activism, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 367 (1984); Posner, The Meaning ofJudicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND.
LJ. 1 (1983). Recent articles defending judicial activism include ClintonJudges Muhtst Make
Law: A Realistic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in a Democratic Society, 67 IowA L. REv. 711
(1982); Johnson, In Defense ofJudicial Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979).
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curtailing a state court's authority to modify the common law are
forcing tort law to remain years behind contemporary social condi-
tions.78 As Professor Ursin suggests, the "evils" of Lochner should
not lead to fear of judicial activism in the common law.79 Lochner
and Kelley, for example, are very dissimilar cases. Lochner involved a
federal court purposefully and directly overruling legislation
through improper constitutional analysis.80 In contrast, Kelley in-
volves a state court developing the common law of torts in an at-
tempt to be consistent with the legislature.8 1
By declaring legislation unconstitutional, Lochner prohibited
the legislature from exercising its law-making authority. Kelley al-
lows the legislature to exercise this authority. The Maryland legis-
lature may accept the court's imposition of strict liability upon
Saturday Night Special manufacturers, or it may enact legislation
that overrules the decision. In Lochner, the Court had the final say;
in Kelley, the legislature will ultimately decide.8 2 No basis exists for
arguing that the legislature is better suited to decide tort liability
issues because the courts are not subject to the "check" of the bal-
lot box. The courts are checked by the legislature itself.
Some argue against judicial activism by stating that the legisla-
ture is better equipped to make informed decisions because of its
ability to conduct hearings and gather information.8 3 Dean Wel-
lington dismisses this argument:
While there can be no question that the fact-finding facilities
available to legislatures through committee hearings and inves-
tigations are frequently helpful . . . this advantage is less than
meets the eye. On many issues more than enough factual infor-
mation is generated without hearings; legislative facts abound
and for every expert there is his equal and opposite number.
Each has published widely; each researched extensively. Judges,
then, often have as many useful legislative facts as do
78 See Ursin, supra note 34, at 230-31.
79 Id. at 263-78.
80 See note 72 supra.
81 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
82 See Ursin, supra note 34, at 254 ("Ultimately, judicial lawmaking is accountable to the
legislative process because legislatures can always act to alterjudicially created common law
... by the simple enactment of a statute.") (emphasis in original).
California recently passed a law specifically prohibiting its courts from imposing strict
liability on Saturday Night Special manufacturers under the "risk/utility test" discussed in
note 16 supra. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.4(a) (West Supp. 1985) provides:
In a products liability action, no firearm or ammunition shall be deemed defective
in design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of
injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death when
discharged.
83 See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 240 (1973).
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legislators. 84
The Kelley court had sufficient information to reach an informed de-
cision.85 Again, the legislature has the right to enact a law overrul-
ing the decision if it concludes otherwise.
The right of the legislature to have the final say in tort law is
not a theoretical one; legislatures have exercised it frequently in the
recent past. The most appropriate recent example of the legisla-
ture exercising final authority in tort law, for present purposes, is in
the area of strict liability. When the courts first introduced strict
liability, they restricted its availability to users and consumers of the
allegedly defective product.8 6 This restriction was unnecessary,
and was apparently due to the courts' reliance on warranty theory
to impose liability.87 The policy reasons behind strict liability88 did
not support restricting causes of action in this manner.8 9 Courts
thus expanded the doctrine to allow a bystander who neither used
nor consumed the product to seek redress against the manufacturer
for his injuries.90 In the end, however, many state legislatures re-
sponded to court decisions in this area by "enacting comprehensive
products liability statutes... [that] define and often limit consumer
remedies for damage and injury caused by allegedly defective
84 Id.
85 The court in Kelley considered the following facts in reaching its decision: (1) the
federal Gun Control Act and federal regulations affecting Saturday Night Specials; (2)
Maryland gun control legislation; (3) transcripts of hearings before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary regarding Saturday Night Specials, including the testimony of top law en-
forcement officials in New York City and Washington, D.C.; (4) transcripts of hearings
before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary; (5) statistical studies of handguns used in crime; (6) transcripts of testimony
of representatives of the National Rifle Association; (7) cases from other jurisdictions; and
(8) law review articles. 304 Md. at 141-55, 159-60, 497 A.2d at 1150-58, 1161.
86 See Davidson v. Leadingham, 294 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Ky. 1968); Hahn v. Ford Motor
Co., 256 Iowa 27, 126 N.W.2d 350 (1964).
87 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also
note 91 infra.
88 In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 59, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963), the landmark strict liability case, the court stated that the "pur-
pose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."
89 In White v. Jeffrey Galion, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 751, 754 (E.D. Il. 1971), the court
stated:
It seems somewhat incongruous to say that a user or consumer of a product has a
right of action against the manufacturer of a defective product, but to withhold
protection from an innocent bystander who has suffered injuries through no fault
of his own ... solely because... [he] was merely standing by innocently minding
his own business when he was suddenly injured by another's use of the defective
product.
90 See Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974); Codling v. Paglia, 32
N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Lamendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J.
Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451
P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969). See also Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 415 (1970).
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products." 9 '
Courts have also prompted the legislatures of various states to
adopt comparative negligence statutes.92 The failure of state legis-
latures to respond to court decisions extending liability in the areas
of misrepresentation, 93 implied warranties of habitability (where
strict liability was imposed),94 abolition of immunities,95 and im-
puted negligence96 suggests legislative acceptance of these judicial
developments. It also lends support to the proposition that the
courts are remarkably able to accurately assess the "demands" of
the times.
Judicial modification of tort law simply does not present the
dangers that opponents of judicial activism dread. In fact, a deci-
sion like Kelley should be encouraged. The courts are not exposed
to the pressures of special interest groups in the same manner as
the legislature. 97 Powerful lobbying groups such as the National
Rifle Association which oppose strong gun control legislation 98 un-
91 2 PROD. LIAB. R7rR. (CCH) 90,000 (1982). See 2 PROD. LIAB. RPTR. (CCH)
90,000-92,602 (1982), which provides a convenient state-by-state listing of products liabil-
ity legislation. Most of these laws were passed in the 1970s, when tort suits were multiply-
ing, the courts were extending liability, and insurance costs were rising at a dramatic rate.
92 Comparative negligence laws have mostly been enacted by state legislatures, but
courts have stated in various decisions that they would adopt comparative negligence them-
selves if the legislature failed to act. The following decisions prompted the legislature to
act: Baab v. Shockling, 61 Ohio St. 2d 55, 399 N.E.2d 87 (1980) (legislature acted in 1980);
Krise v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1971) (legislature acted in 1973); Peterson v. Culp,
255 Or. 269, 465 P.2d 876 (1970) (legislature acted in 1971); Loui v. Oakley, 50 Hawaii
260, 438 P.2d 393 (1968) (legislature acted in 1968); Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202
Minn. 425, 281 N.W. 261 (1938) (legislature acted in 1971).
In other states, the courts adopted comparative negligence; the legislature did not
overrule these decisions. See Alvis v. Ribar, 82 Ill. 2d 1, 52 Ill. Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886
(1981); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Bradley v. Appalachian Power
Co., 256 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1979); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275
N.W.2d 511 (1978); Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13
Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v.Jones, 280 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1973).
93 Courts have both created and denied causes of action to third parties injured as a
result of a misrepresentation made by one party of a contract to another. See Prosser, Mis-
representation and Thira Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 229 (1966).
94 See Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Humber v. Morton, 426
S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965);
Carpenter v. Donahue, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
95 See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (abolishing parental immu-
nity); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (abolish-
ing state and local governmental immunity); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d
771 (1972) (abolishing family immunities); Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d
599 (Mo. 1969) (abolishing charitable immunity).
96 See Note, Liability for Tortious Conduct of Others, 47J. URB. L. 868 (1970).
97 See Wellington, supra note 83, at 240-41.
98 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 2 n.7. Senator Kennedy points out that:
Numerous measures regulating the control of handguns were introduced during
the 1981 legislative year [for example], but none reached the floor in either cham-
ber. For years the powerful National Rifle Association, a 1.8 million member spe-
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doubtedly oppose an extension of strict liability to Saturday Night
Special manufacturers. Yet the will of these groups is not necessar-
ily the will of the people. 99
A decision such as Kelley bridges the gap between the powerful
gun lobby and the relatively powerless "gun victim" lobby by forc-
ing the former to spend its money fighting for change rather than
the status quo. 100 If the people of the state of Maryland oppose
Kelley, legislation will certainly follow. On the other hand, if they
support the decision, the court has frustrated the gun lobby's at-
tempt to thwart the democratic process by exerting an influence
that exceeds its popular support. Those who argue that it is im-
proper for a court to engage in law-making of any kind, including
tort law; and those who argue that only the legislature can repre-
sent the people are thinking in terms of "democratic theory" rather
than "political reality."' 0 ' The court in Kelley acted within its his-
torical realm of authority in extending strict liability to Saturday
Night Special manufacturers. It did not engage in "dangerous" ju-
dicial activism since it declared no law unconstitutional. In fact, the
court stressed its desire to remain consistent with the legislature.
Thus, in assessing Kelley, it is inappropriate to conclude that the
decision "endangers" the democratic process. It is also premature
to predict an unlimited expansion of strict liability law.
IV. The Impact of Kelley on Strict Liability Law
The Kelley decision has already generated considerable contro-
versy. In evaluating the potential impact of the case, two authors
declared:
[T]he court's opinion, unprincipled and heedless of jurispru-
dential reasoning as it is, contains no limitation which would
confine the results of [the] case to any discrete category of prod-
ucts. Although the opinion was clearly intended ... to apply
[only] to... "Saturday Night Specials," its disconsonant reason-
ing could be applied to any product.10 2
Such concerns are premature for several reasons. First, Kelley
is not the first instance in which a court has imposed strict liability
for "the sale of goods involving a considerable risk to the pub-
cial interest group, has been successful in preventing any significant congressional
action on handgun legislation.
Id. (citing 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 420 (1981)).
99 See Wellington, supra note 83, at 240-41.
100 See Ursin, supra note 34, at 254 ("Judicial lawmaking in the common law often simply
shifts the burden of obtaining legislative action to interest groups that had benefited from
the previous law.").
101 Id. at 259.
102 Dorr & Burch, supra note 9, at 15.
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lic."103 Some jurisdictions, for example, have enacted "Dram
Shop" or Civil Liability Acts which impose strict liability upon the
seller of alcoholic beverages if the sale results in injury to a third
party by means of an intoxicated buyer. 10 4 Courts have held these
Acts constitutional,1 0 5 and in most cases the Acts are liberally con-
strued to provide adequate relief to plaintiffs. 10 6 Certainly the man-
ufacture and sale of Saturday Night Specials poses a similar risk to
the public. 10 7
Second, because the holding in Kelley is very specific, it is un-
likely that the court's reasoning will extend beyond the Saturday
Night Special arena.10 8 The court merely placed a particular prod-
uct in a "special" category because its manufacturers were aware
that their product is mainly used in criminal activity, 10 9 the product
103 W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 81, at 581 (5th ed. 1984).
104 For a list of states having Dram Shop Acts, see 12 Am.Jur. 2d Trials § 2, at 733 (1966
& Supp. 1985).
105 See Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15
(1957).
106 See Lavieri v. Ulysses, 149 Conn. 396, 180 A.2d 632 (1962); Pierce, 144 Conn. 241,
129 A.2d 606; Hahm v. Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254 (1953). On the other
hand, at least one state court has held that because Dram Shop Acts are penal in nature,
they should be strictly construed. See Moran v. Katsinas, 16 Ill. 2d 169, 157 N.E.2d 38
(1959).
107 See Fields, supra note 1. Dram Shop Acts are, of course, legislative enactments. How-
ever, once it is accepted that courts also have authority to modify the common law, exactly
which branch announces the law becomes unimportant. See notes 59-64 supra and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, Prosser points out that strict liability "has been found at the com-
mon law in the 'Dramshop' situation, where the defendant sells liquor to an intoxicated
person, and a third person suffers injury." W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§ 81, at 582 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added). See Galvin v.Jennings, 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir.
1961); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Berkeley v. Park,
47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1965);Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge Co., 413 Pa. 626,
198 A.2d 550 (1964); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963). See
also Cahn, New Common Law Dramshop Rule, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 302 (1960).
The legislature's announcing of an extension of strict liability remains important, how-
ever, because the legislature can expressly limit the court's authority to interpret the law.
Thus, in Robinson v. Bognanno, 213 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1973), the Supreme Court of Iowa,
interpreting the state's Dram Shop Act, stated:
In adopting the statutory right of recovery against dram shop operators legislature
expressly and carefully limited the class of persons to whom that right was given.
It would not be a proper judicial function to amend the legislation by interpreta-
tion so as to enlarge the class. Such an amendment would be the exclusive prov-
ince of the legislature.
Id. at 532. The court in Kelley was not limited by the legislature in the same manner; hence,
it felt free to modify the common law of torts.
108 The court stated that "no case to the best of our knowledge has heretofore dealt with
the particular form of liability recognized in... this opinion." 304 Md. at 162, 497 A.2d at
1162. The court declined to impose strict liability on Saturday Night Special manufacturers
who sold their handguns before the date of this opinion for this reason: "While manufac-
turers and marketers of handguns have or should have [known that their guns were used in
crime] ... until now they had little reason to anticipate that their actions might result in tort
liability." Id. at 161-62, 497 A.2d at 1162.
109 See note 52 supra.
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is strictly regulated by Congress and the Maryland legislature," 0
and the product has little or no legitimate use."1 Thus, because
Kelley emphasizes a specific product, it does not "open the door" to
excessive liability for the manufacture of other products that are
not defective but cause injury in any event.
Moreover, Kelley imposes strict liability on manufacturers of
Saturday Night Specials only under specific circumstances. The
court made clear that not only must the product be a "Saturday
Night Special," 112 but also that the potential class of plaintiffs
"could [only] include the intended victims of ... crime, innocent
persons who are unintentionally shot by [a] criminal, and law en-
forcement personnel and others who intervene to prevent [a]
crime."113 Kelley therefore does not impose strict liability on a Sat-
urday Night Special manufacturer if a purchaser for self-protection
accidentally discharges the firearm and injures himself or a third
party, since no criminal act took place.
Thus, the Kelley holding is simply too specific to manipulate in
future cases. It does not signal an unlimited expansion of strict lia-
bility law; it merely attempts to fill a gap in this law "in light of the
ever growing number of deaths and injuries due to [Saturday Night
Specials] being used in criminal activity . ."114
V. Conclusion
Current strict liability theory does not impose liability upon
Saturday Night Special manufacturers when their product functions
as expected in a criminal's hand. Courts, however, are not re-
stricted to current strict liability theory; they should be encouraged
to modify the common law to conform to contemporary conditions
and values.
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.
acted within its authority when it extended strict liability to Satur-
day Night Special manufacturers. In doing so, it redressed an egre-
gious situation that the legislature had neglected. While Kelley was
an aggressive decision, its extension of strict liability does not con-
stitute improper judicial activism. The decision is consistent with
federal and state gun control legislation and does not prevent the
legislature from exercising its final authority in the matter. It is up
to the legislature to overrule, modify, or accept the decision. Even
if the legislature overrules Kelley, the court should be commended.
The court addressed a neglected area of the law, and prompted the
110 See notes 42-51 supra and accompanying text.
111 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158.
112 Id. at 157-58, 497 A.2d at 1159-60.
113 Id. at 159, 497 A.2d at 1160 n.20.
114 Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
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legislature to firmly decide where it stands on an important issue.
In this sense, the court will have assisted rather than undermined
the democratic process.
It is premature to conclude that Kelley leads to an unlimited
expansion of strict liability to manufacturers of products that
neither are defective nor malfunction. The holding of the case is
too narrow to apply to any product except a Saturday Night Special.
The court expressly created a specific exception to a general rule.
Patrick S. Davies
